So Many Religions

With so many religions out there, how could anyone think his is the only truth? That seems naive, foolish, unreasonable, perhaps even arrogant.

Austin Cline, a humanist writer, expresses this argument as clearly as anyone else:

Is there any good, sound, rational, reasonable basis for singling out just one interpretation of one set of traditions from one of these religions which should be treated as true while all the others are treated as false? No. It's not logically impossible…, but the great diversity of beliefs means that anyone who claims this will have to demonstrate that their chosen religion is unequivocally more likely to be true and is more credible than all the others. That won't be easy to do.

We may call this the Argument from Many Religions. It can be summarized as follows:

1. People make conflicting religious claims.

2. There is no way to decisively prove which religious claims are true.

3. If people make conflicting religious claims, and there is no way to decisively prove which claims are true, then it is unreasonable to believe any religious claims.

4. So, it is unreasonable to believe any religious claims.

Notice the conclusion doesn’t deny any religion is true. It denies we know whether any is. It’s a claim about what is reasonable to believe. (By analogy, maybe intelligent aliens exist, but even if they do, we lack sufficient evidence.)

The argument is valid (if the premises are true, so is the conclusion). What should we make of the premises?

Premises 1 & 2

We should just grant premises 1 and 2. As for premise 1, it is pretty clear religions do make conflicting claims. For instance, Christians claim Jesus was divine; Muslims, he was not divine. And as for premise 2, since decisive proof is a pretty lofty standard, I doubt we can prove Christianity is true, or any other religion, or most of what we believe, for that matter. Perhaps some believers have evidence for their religious views—even evidence sufficient to justify belief—but proof is much more demanding.

That leaves premise 3. And that, I think, is where the action is at.

Premise 3

Premise 3 is, to my mind, the crucial premise. This is the weighty philosophical claim. It introduces a rule for deciding whether religious beliefs are reasonable. It offers a standard of evidence.

The standard is, recall, that if religions make conflicting claims, and there is no way to decisively prove which is correct, then it is unreasonable to believe any religion.

But isn't it arbitrary to restrict this rule to religious beliefs? If it is a correct standard of evidence, it should apply to any beliefs. Otherwise, we are owed a story as to why religious beliefs have to pass their own special test.

Stated more generally, then, premise 3 would say this:

3* For any topic, if people make conflicting claims about that topic, and there is no way to decisively prove which claims are true, then it is unreasonable to believe any of those claims.

Here’s my point: If we accept premise 3, we should also accept 3*. There seems to be no reason to have a standard of evidence that applies only to religious beliefs; our standards should apply to any beliefs.

But that means, conversely, if we reject 3*, we should also reject premise 3. And that, I’ll argue, is exactly what we should do.

Supporting 3*

First of all, why should we accept 3*, or 3 for that matter? It is, after all, the skeptic who is advancing the argument. He owes us justification for the claims he relies on. And rarely is this claim justified. (Certainly, Austin Cline doesn't do so in the piece quoted earlier; he simply asserts premise 3.) And until 3* is supported, the Argument from Many Religions has little force.

Fortunately, however, we can be more constructive than that. We can show positively that 3* is false. For it faces at least three problems.

Problem #1. Sweeping skepticism

Lots of our beliefs would fail the test 3* sets out. After all, just consider in how many areas people have disputes that cannot be resolved with decisive proof. To illustrate, here is a list of claims many of which you probably believe or find sympathetic:

• We should not enslave people we have defeated in war.

• The poor should have a political say, same as the rich.

• Poetry that follows no metrical form can be perfectly good.

• Women should have the same educational opportunities as men.

• Sex should be confined to heterosexual marriages.

• Incest among first cousins is inherently wrong.

• It is morally acceptable to call your parents and teachers by their first names.

• Democracy is more just than monarchy.

• Art can be whatever you want; it’s all about self-expression.

• Diverse beliefs are a good thing for a society to have.

Probably, you believe at least half of these claims. However, all of them have been widely rejected in traditional societies, past and present. There is as much conflict here as there is between religions. But I doubt you can conclusively prove any of the above. What would your proof be? Just try to spell it out.

Now, does that mean it is unreasonable to believe these things? Should you let go of your belief that slavery is wrong? Surely not. But that’s what (3*) would tell you to do. And that just shows that (3*) cuts too broadly, and therein lies its doom. After all, what’s more rational—believe (3*), or believe slavery is wrong? What makes (3*) so special?

Problem #2. Counterexamples

Imagine you are out to lunch with a friend, whom you regard as no less intelligent than yourself, certainly no less competent at arithmetic. When you get the bill, you try to add up who owes what. The total is $60, and your lobster was $38. So you figure your friend owes $22.

But he disagrees. He takes the receipt, does the math, and announces that he owes $23. And he is absolutely sure.

Naturally, this gives you pause. You examine the receipt again. Yep, $22. But your friend, who also examines the receipt a second time, insists that he owes $23.

Should you downgrade your confidence in your estimate? Obviously not. You should downgrade your confidence in your friend's math skills, perhaps. Certainly, you should reject his verdict on this occasion. But the mere fact that he disagrees with you, and that you cannot decisively prove he is wrong, does not make your confidence unreasonable.

"But," you say, "that's different. In math, you can prove who's right. In religion, you can't."

Well, in my lunch example, there's no proving who's right. There's no calculator, no advanced credentials, no third party to settle the dispute. It’s just you and him and your best judgment.

"Okay,” you object, “but in principle you could prove who is right about the lunch bill. You can go home and use your calculator or ask your mathy friend."

Doesn't matter. I'm not asking whether your belief is reasonable later in the day, under different conditions. I'm asking if your belief is reasonable right there in the restaurant. And it seems it is. So we have a counterexample to 3*. Sometimes, it’s perfectly reasonable to dig in your heels.

Problem #3. Self-defeat

But it gets worse. For 3* is self-defeating. This may come as news, but philosophers today debate 3* and similar ideas. And many luminaries—such as Ernest Sosa, Alvin Plantinga, and Thomas Kelly—would reject 3*. So, 3* is a topic about which people make conflicting claims. And neither can we prove 3* decisively. In fact, as far as I’m aware, skeptics can’t provide even a single reason in its favor. And even if they could, that is a far-cry from decisive proof. Indeed, hardly any substantive philosophical claims—and make no mistake, 3* is such a claim—can be proven in this way.

Then what happens when we apply 3* to itself? Remember, 3* offers a test for reasonable belief, a test that applies to any topic, any claim. Since 3* is itself a claim, it needs to pass the test it sets before us. But it simply doesn’t. 3* is such that (a) people disagree about it, and (b) we cannot prove it decisively. Let that sink in. By its own lights, 3* is unreasonable to believe. If 3* were true, that would imply we should reject it.

Summing up

I’ve given three independently sufficient reasons for rejecting 3*. First, it leads to sweeping skepticism. Second, it is subject to counterexample. And third, it is self-defeating. We should therefore reject 3*. And if we should reject 3*, we should reject 3, its application to religious belief. The Argument from Many Religions is a failure.

A plea for intellectual grit

I expect certain doubts may linger. Something about all those religions being out there is just so troubling for us enlightened modern people. How can you be justified in thinking you’re right and everyone else is wrong?

Well, how are you justified in holding any of your beliefs in areas of controversy? I bet you have beliefs about abortion, racism, women’s rights, animal rights, and much else besides. I bet you have beliefs about what things are worth doing, and what things are a waste of time. Just look at the bulleted list above. But these are all areas where others disagree with you. And as far as I’m concerned, you needn’t be able to prove them wrong; neither does that mean you’re irrational. All of us piece our worldviews together over the years through experience, intuition, reflection, feeling, and judgment as we talk things out with the people we trust. We do the best we can with the minds we have. And even if we cannot articulate it—for that is quite another thing—we come to possess much evidence throughout our lives, evidence that lends to our convictions, though not certainty, credibility—enough that we may be people seeking truth in earnest. Besides, sticking only to knowledge of the highest certainty would be a truncated life, one in which we value nothing, cherish nothing, make no stands and take no cognitive risks.

But, you might object, people who disagree with us can say the same thing about their views!

And so what? Maybe in disagreeing with you, they, too, are rational. Conflicting beliefs cannot both be true, but conflicting believers can both be justified. What we want—it has been our cultural obsession since the Enlightenment—is a sort of public proof we can hold up for all to see, to settle all disputes and compel assent from all decent people. But rarely is such proof available, and the more important the issue, the less likely we are to find it. That doesn’t mean we should join the skeptic, only that we should reject the lofty standards of evidence on which the skeptic relies.